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to natural hazard-associated disasters
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ABSTRACT
Natural hazards affect development and can cause significant and
long-term suffering for those affected. Research has shown that
sustained long-term disaster preparedness combined with
appropriate response and recovery are needed to deliver effective
risk reductions. However, as the newly agreed Sendai framework
recognises, this knowledge has not been translated into action.
This research aims to contribute to our understanding of how to
deliver longer term and sustained risk reduction by evaluating the
role of political decentralisation in disaster outcomes. Specifically,
we investigate whether countries which devolve power to the
local level experience reduced numbers of people affected by
storms and earthquakes, and have lower economic damage. Using
regression analysis and cross-country data from 1950 to 2006, we
find that, in relation to both storms and earthquakes, greater
transfers of political power to subnational tiers of government
reduce hazard impacts on the population. The downside is that
more politically decentralised countries, which are usually
wealthier countries, can increase the direct economic losses
associated with a natural hazard impact after the storm or
earthquake than those which are more centralised. However,
overall, it seems advantageous to give subnational governments
more authority and autonomy in storm and earthquake risk
planning.
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1. Introduction
Disasters, which are the result of natural hazards, can act as a confounding factor in devel-
opment.1 Estimates suggest that from 1992 to 2012, disasters killed 1.3 million people, and
caused US$2 trillion of damage – far exceeding the amount provided in development
assistance over the same period (Foresight, 2012). In a 20-year study from 1995 to 2015,
the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and the United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction estimated that, on average, 30,000 deaths
were attributed to weather-related disasters (UNISDR, 2015). The fact that natural
hazard-associated disasters delay development and cause significant harm is undisputed,
and theories of how to reduce this level of harm are well developed (Wisner, Blaikie,
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Cannon, & Davis, 2004). There is widespread agreement internationally that action is
needed, seen most recently through the adoption of the Sendai Framework on Disaster
Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015). This framework espouses improved understanding of dis-
aster risk; strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; public and
private investments in disaster risk reduction for widespread societal resilience and to
deliver better recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction through enhancing disaster pre-
paredness. These principles build on previous international efforts to reduce the damage
from natural hazards, notably, the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’ and the ‘International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction Programme Forum 1999’. Although reports indicate some
success in declining disaster fatalities, this contrasts with slow progress in reducing
damage and loss. This slow progress stresses the importance of the role of governance,
especially at local scales, in reducing disaster risks.
This paper aims to investigate whether political decentralisation, especially more locally
representative democracy, can minimise disaster losses, after controlling for factors recog-
nised as key determinants of human and economic disaster outcomes. Political decentra-
lisation here refers to the distribution of power in public decision-making from the central
government to citizens or their elected representatives. It is usually present where there is
representative government and pluralism in politics. There is an argument that decentra-
lisation can improve the provision of local public goods and services, as there is more local
accountability and representation (Bardhan, 2002; Faguet, 2014AQ2
¶
; Marks & Lebel, 2016;
Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). Our central hypothesis in this paper is that more politically
decentralised countries fare better, when affected by natural hazards, in terms of
damage to the population and the economy. If this hypothesis proves correct, we will
be able to provide concrete guidance on governance improvements that can reduce dis-
aster losses and deliver on the Sendai framework.
Our analysis focuses specifically on disasters triggered by storms and earthquakes due
to differences in their predictability (i.e. earthquakes are less predictable than storms) and
hence the ability of governance bodies to prepare for them. In the 40 years from 1972 to
2012, earthquakes, storms and droughts were the three largest causes of disaster mortality
(Foresight, 2012), despite some advances in development and participatory application of
early warning systems (Basher, 2006; Twigg, 2003).
Significant and widespread advances can be seen in the science of short term and sea-
sonal forecasting of storms (DeMaria, Sampson, Knaff, & Musgrave, 2014AQ3
¶
; Kahn, 2005).
Earthquakes remain less predictable than storms, although in some countries there is
more effective integration of earthquake risk into planning than for storms (Sorensen,
2000AQ4
¶
). We argue that there is a lack of political decentralisation and, more specifically, a
lack of local representation in decision-making about information needs for disaster pre-
paredness. Hence, weather forecasts and early warning systems are not necessarily devel-
oped with the users’ needs in mind. Delegating power may help to reduce disaster risks. In
other words, giving citizens or their elected representatives more power in public
decision-making may improve community resilience to disasters. This is associated with
pluralistic politics, representative government and democracy.
Political decentralisation, which is a top-down process, can occur in multiple economic
and political contexts. Hence, we also explore the role of national wealth, political orien-
tation and local representation in the relationship between political decentralisation
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and damage associated with natural hazards. More specifically, we identify whether there
are differences in this relationship: (a) between middle-income and high-income countries,
(b) between countries with left, centre and right-wing politics and (c) between countries
with different types of local representation. Thus, national wealth, political orientation
and local representation are examined as mediating variables. Previous research has
shown that meditating factors play a key role in the effect of decentralisation on the
reduction of damage associated with natural hazards. Yamamura (2012), for instance,
shows that decentralisation makes a greater contribution to mitigating damage in
countries with higher quality institutions.
Various studies have been undertaken which allude to the importance of governance
mechanisms in disaster outcomes (e.g. Brooks, Adger, & Kelly, 2005), but no macro-level
study has been undertaken on the relationship between political decentralisation and
natural hazard-associated disaster outcomes while analysing the mediating role of
national wealth, political orientation and local representation. Cross-national studies in
this area either have dwelt on fiscal decentralisation (Ahmed & Iqbal, 2009; Escaleras &
Register, 2012; Skidmore & Toya, 2013; Yamamura, 2012) or are case studies (Ainuddin,
Aldrich, Routray, Ainuddin, & Achkazai, 2013; Blackburn, 2014; Marks & Lebel, 2016).
Using cross-country data over the 1950–2006 period, our study reveals that political
decentralisation is correlated with disaster outcomes, and hence indicates the importance
of focusing new disaster mitigation initiatives and future disaster risk reduction research
on this area.
2. Literature review
2.1. Disaster risk reduction as an evolving field
A rich body of literature on natural hazards and disasters, dating back over 60 years, high-
lights the complexity of interactions between politics, economics, society, hazards and the
resulting human and economic disaster outcomes. Vulnerability theory, for example,
recognises both the role of exposure to hazards and the impact of social and economic
deprivation on disaster outcomes (Adger, 2006). Hazard theory catalogues the root
causes of vulnerability that create worsening disaster outcomes, pointing to power struc-
tures, political ideologies and economic systems that contribute to people living in unsafe
conditions (Wisner et al., 2004). Sadly, the catalogue of recent major disasters (e.g. Hurri-
cane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005; Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh in 2007; the Haiti earth-
quake in 2010; Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013; the Amatrice earthquake in Italy
in 2016 to name a few) indicates that despite improved theoretical explanation of why dis-
asters happen, appropriate mitigating actions are not being taken, so tragic disasters still
happen.
Globally, it is now recognised that disaster losses are most effectively lowered by redu-
cing disaster risks. In this context, government plays a vital role in both the preparation for
and response to disaster events. Recent research has started to unravel the components of
community resilience to hazards and disasters to clarify the role of the governance
context. For example, Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum (2008) recog-
nise the importance of the equitable distribution of post-disaster resources. Twigg (2007)
identifies the importance of integrated multi-scale decision-making, accountability and
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community participation. Djalante, Holley, and Thomalla (2011) recognise the importance
of polycentric and multi-layered institutions, and following Tompkins, Lemos, and Boyd
(2008), the central role of participation and collaboration, self-organisation and effective
local networks in post-disaster recovery. Ainuddin et al. (2013) identify the usefulness of
efficient preparedness and coordination of provisional and national level agencies to
enhance community awareness and preparedness. According to Wisner et al. (2004)
and Marks and Lebel (2016), greater local participation in decisions is expected to lead
to more appropriate and sustainable disaster risk reduction interventions. All of these
areas are linked to the extent to which the political system is decentralised, as this deter-
mines whether resources can flow to those who need them quickly.
2.2. Local government and political decentralisation
Although the vulnerability and hazard literature explains the causes of natural hazards, this
paper takes a step forward by examining whether political decentralisation, whereby
power and resources flow to the local level, can reduce the human and economic
damage associated with natural hazards. Both natural hazards and political decentralisa-
tion have a local or regional dimension. Natural hazards strike a local or regional part of
a country (Escaleras & Register, 2012), they rarely affect entire nations. Political decentra-
lisation refers to the degree to which central government allows local or regional govern-
ment entities to undertake the political functions of governance (Pike, Rodriguez-Pose,
Tomaney, Torrisi, & Tselios, 2012), and hence to prepare for region-specific risks and
respond effectively to regional crises. Moreover, international organisations, such as the
World Bank, recognise the importance of decentralisation, by including it as a requirement
in their development assistance programmes (Escaleras & Register, 2012). However, local
government and political decentralisation have both pros and cons for humans and the
economy.
On the one hand, delivered effectively decentralisation can bring government closer to
the people by improving the provision of local public goods and services (Bardhan, 2002;
Faguet, 2014; Marks & Lebel, 2016; Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). Greater transfers of political
powers to local and regional bodies can promote a better matching of public policies to
local needs. Subnational governments may have an information advantage over central
governments when it comes to responding to the heterogeneous needs of local citizens
and especially when these needs arise from disasters. Although central government may
be better placed to respond due to greater access to resources, locally elected govern-
ments are better placed geographically and politically to respond to local needs, due to
their proximity to those affected (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstrom, 2005;
Chhotray & Few, 2012; Norris et al., 2008; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2011). Relatively,
more decentralised countries may fare better when disasters occur in terms of their
effects on the population and on the economy, because local and regional officials are
better able to set the optimal mix of local and regional policies prior to the disaster
event than bureaucrats in distant central governments (de Mello, 2011; Lessmann, 2009;
Tselios, Rodríguez-Pose, Pike, Tomaney, & Torrisi, 2012). It has been argued that decentra-
lisation increases social capital, which has been shown to improve community resilience to
natural hazard-associated disasters (e.g. see Brouwer & Nhassengo, 2006; Murphy, 2007;
Paton, Millar, & Johnston, 2001; Tompkins, Hurlston, & Poortinga, 2009). When delivered
4 V. TSELIOS AND E. TOMPKINS
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
175
180
effectively, decentralisation promotes greater voice and participation and limits the oppor-
tunities for corruption (Brenner, 2004; Le Galès, 2002; Weingast, 2009). It empowers under-
represented groups in society, including marginalised groups (e.g. the less well-off, the
socially excluded and immigrants) by giving them a local voice. Such empowerment
may lead to the adoption of local disaster risk reduction policies involving a wider
range of actors and which are thus more sensitive to the local needs to prepare for and
manage a natural hazard. Overall, subnational governments are perceived to have a com-
parative advantage over national governments in the management of land use, economic
development, safety and other local-based policies that affect disaster risk (Skidmore &
Toya, 2013, p. 45).
On the other hand, political decentralisation can create negative effects for humans and
the economy. First of all, there is a role for national governments in setting certain disaster
management policies (Skidmore & Toya, 2013). Decentralisation may reduce the capacity
of central government to transfer post-disaster resources to those most badly affected,
from the less-damaged to the more-damaged localities. In general, the differences in
socioeconomic endowment and institutional capacities among regions within any given
country may undermine the potential benefits associated with the better matching of pol-
icies to local needs (Kamel, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). For example, in regions
with extreme poverty and loss of economies of scale, decentralisation may not mean a
better matching of the provision of local public goods and services, because these
regions face capacity constraints (Pelling, 2011; Prud’homme, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose &
Ezcurra, 2011). In some contexts, local government is not capable of interacting effectively
with the international disaster relief agencies (Holloway, 2003). Further, subnational gov-
ernments may attract fewer skilled and capable officials and decision-makers (Prud’-
homme, 1995), implying that subnational governments can end-up being less efficient
at delivering disaster risk reduction. Moreover, some countries often devolve responsibil-
ities but not skills or human and financial resources (Marks & Lebel, 2016). Finally, with
higher degrees of decentralisation, there are costs associated with establishing multiple
layers of government (Escaleras & Register, 2012). This can create some redundancy in
government, which can deliver more flexible responses in times of stress. Poor countries
may not be able to afford this cost of providing institutional redundancy. Where there are
multiple tiers of government, accountability can be weak as citizens may be less able to
identify responsible individuals to attribute blame for failures and credit for successes
(Fisman & Gatti, 2002). Local traps can also arise because a narrow focus on local percep-
tions, knowledge and interests may become a barrier to recognising solutions from other
locations or that are available at other levels (Brown & Purcell, 2005). All these factors may
offset the assumed benefits of political decentralisation. Overall, there is an optimal mix of
responsibility between national and subnational governments in disaster management
risk which requires coordination and the sharing of costs between national and subna-
tional governments (Marks & Lebel, 2016; Skidmore & Toya, 2013).
2.3. The role of economic development, political institutions and local
representation
Up to this point, we have focused on the question of whether political decentralisation can
improve disaster outcomes. However, the distribution of the benefits and costs of
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decentralisation is dependent on national economic and political factors. In this subsec-
tion, we examine whether economic development, political institutions and local rep-
resentation affect the possible association between disaster outcomes and political
decentralisation.
First, we expect that the relationship between disaster outcomes and political decentra-
lisation varies with levels of economic development. Specifically, the negative effects of
decentralisation may most affect the poorer regions of the less-developed countries,
due to their lack of resources and capacity to address natural hazards. Poorer regions
face greater budget constraints than richer ones, while the latter rely on their own reven-
ues, meaning that they are often in a better shape to address problems (Tselios et al.,
2012). The positive effects of decentralisation are less likely to occur in less-developed
countries, due to the absence of strong local accountability and higher levels of corrup-
tion, nepotism and clientelism. Examples of good practice do exist, for example, in
Ceará, Brazil, where locally active leaders managed to push for greater accountability in
drought management (Lemos, 2007). Cheshire and Gordon (1998) argue that the transfer
of powers and resources to subnational tiers of government benefits the most prosperous
regions, such as those with better socioeconomic endowments. Richer regions can gener-
ally extract greater resources, not only through the taxation of their own citizens but also
through a greater political leverage to negotiate with the central government (Rodríguez-
Pose & Ezcurra, 2011; Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2004). This argument is often reinforced
through the literature on social capital and disaster recovery, which highlights the fact
that those communities which are better linked to policy-makers, at any level of govern-
ment, tend to experience more rapid rates of post-disaster recovery (Aldrich, 2012). Hence,
the degree to which economic agents benefit from and are able to comply with and
employ their own established safety standards depends on the level of economic devel-
opment (Skidmore & Toya, 2013, p. 45). Despite our assumptions that richer nations will
recover more quickly (for example, due to effective building regulations, careful develop-
ment planning, provision of higher quality infrastructure and resource availability to
provide high-quality emergency care (Kahn, 2005)), rich nations are not always the site
of best practice. Cuba, a poor country with a centrally planned economy in the Caribbean,
is often cited as an exemplar of disaster risk reduction (Sims & Vogelmann, 2002; Thomp-
son & Gaviria, 2004). The United States of America, in contrast, delivered very poor quality
disaster risk reduction in response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 (Colten,
Kates, & Laska, 2008; Laska & Morrow, 2006). While the political context of Hurricane
Katrina was highly significant, this example serves to show that national wealth is not a
straightforward indicator of successful disaster risk reduction.
Second, we expect that the relationship between disaster outcomes and political
decentralisation varies with political orientation. Notably, the effects of decentralisation
and thus the opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs may differ in
countries with more dominant left-wing or right-wing politics, because of differences in
political strategies towards local authorities and central government. Left-wing politics
support socioeconomic equality and egalitarianism, often in opposition to the socioeco-
nomic hierarchy and inequality, advocate strong government intervention in the
economy and prefer local control of the economy, while right-wing politics support the
socioeconomic order, stratification, hierarchy and inequality, advocate little government
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intervention in the economy and prefer a decentralised economy based on economic
freedom.
Third, we anticipate that the effects of decentralisation will differ according to the
extent of local representation. There are countries where both the legislature and executive
are locally elected, countries where the executive is appointed but the legislature is locally
elected, and countries where neither the executive nor the legislature are locally elected,
when it comes to the municipal governments or the state/province governments. We
argue that countries with different types of local representation are likely to perform dif-
ferently in disaster recovery, due to differences in approaches to post-disaster macroeco-
nomic stabilisation (Oates, 1999; Tselios et al., 2012) and in regional redistribution of post-
disaster resources. The role of local representation is a key factor because an appropriate
political setting for downward accountability requires a suitable environment for local
elected leaders to act independently and responsively (Yilmaz, Beris, & Serrano-Berthet,
2008). The local leadership will be influenced by at least three sets of factors: the insti-
tutional arrangements for the separation of powers among the executive, legislative
and judicial bodies; the election laws and the electoral system and the existence and func-
tioning of a party system and political party laws (Yilmaz et al., 2008). Overall, local rep-
resentation is likely to mediate the relationship between political decentralisation and
disaster outcomes.
3. Data, variables and empirical functions
3.1. Data sources
We now explore the relationship between political decentralisation and disaster occur-
rence associated with natural hazards, after controlling for some economic and natural
characteristics. The control variables are used not only to capture some structural charac-
teristics of the countries and to deal with some important sources of heterogeneity but
also as statistical controls in order to make the estimated parameters of the main explana-
tory variable (i.e. political decentralisation) more precise.
Data on the disaster outcomes were obtained from the Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT).2 This database contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects
of over 18,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to the present. Thus, this is a
panel database. In order for a disaster to be entered into the database, at least 1
of the following 4 criteria (known as CRED criteria) has to be fulfilled: 10 or more
people reported killed, 100 or more people reported affected, a call for international
assistance and a declaration of a state of emergency. The EM-DAT database is an
unbalanced panel database, because (a) if a country–year has experienced a disaster,
it must satisfy one or more of the above four criteria and must have data available on
all the following variables: number of people killed, injured, homeless and affected
and estimated economic damage (Escaleras & Register, 2012), (b) a country–year
has experienced a disaster but it has not been observed (especially before 1988)
and (c) a country–year has not experienced a disaster.3 Thus, some countries might
experience multiple disasters associated with natural hazards in the same year,
while others experience none.
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 7
275
280
285
290
295
300
305
310
315
Political decentralisation is proxied by regional authority indices defined by Hooghe,
Marks, and Schakel (2008b). These indices cover 42 middle-income and high-income
countries (but not low-income countries), and cover 8 dimensions of regional authority,
for the years 1950 to 2006. Countries are coded on an annual basis for years in which a
country is independent and (semi-)democratic (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2008a, p.
259). Hooghe et al. (2008b) consider two domains of regional authority: ‘Self-rule’ and
‘Shared-rule’.4 The aggregate ‘Self-rule’ and ‘Shared-rule’ score constitutes the overall
regional authority: the Regional Authority Index, or ‘RAI-total’ score. We recognise that
the level of political decentralisation varies between countries. For instance, in 2006,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (score = 30.5), Germany (score = 29.3), Belgium (score = 29),
United States (score = 23), Canada (score = 22.7) and Italy (score = 22.7) have the highest
‘RAI-total’ score. All these political decentralisation indices have several advantages over
rival ones, such as the Schneider (2003) index, as they measure political decentralisation
along a multitude of dimensions and allow for some change over time (Tselios et al.,
2012). For example, the ‘RAI-total’ score for Belgium is 14 from 1950 to 1969, 22.9 from
1970 to 1979, 25.8 from 1980 to 1988, 32.1 from 1989 to 1994 and 29 from 1995 to
2006. Regional Authority Indices have been used in many recent studies (Rodríguez-
Pose & Ezcurra, 2010, 2011; Tselios et al., 2012); however, as with the EM-DAT database,
this is an unbalanced database, because it does not provide regional authority scores
for all of the years 1950–2006.5
Data on controls were obtained from the Penn World Table (PWT)6 and the EM-DAT
database. The PWT provides economic data for 189 countries for some or all of the
years 1950–2010. This database is produced by researchers at the University of Pennsylva-
nia and is based on the so-called benchmark comparisons of the International Comparison
Programme. It allows for real quantity comparisons both between countries and over time
and it has been used in many comparative studies. However, the PWT database is also an
unbalanced database.7
We combined EM-DAT, Hooghe et al. (2008b) and PWT, to generate a database of 41
countries from 1950 and 2006 (i.e. Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom and United States). This resulting database contains only high- and
upper middle-income countries and is amenable to estimation methods that manage
potential heterogeneity bias (Rodríguez-Pose & Tselios, 2009). The missing year–
country observations of political decentralisation for those countries which have experi-
enced a storm or earthquake according to the CRED specific criteria is low and thus unli-
kely to affect the association between disaster outcomes and political decentralisation
(see Appendix).
3.2. Variables and descriptive statistics
For the purposes of this project, we consider two types of disaster associated with natural
hazards: storms8 and earthquakes (seismic activities). In this study, we also use three
indices (variables) to measure the impacts of these two natural hazards.
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(A) The number of total people affected. This includes three categories:
. number of people injured (i.e. people suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an
illness requiring medical treatment as a direct results of a disaster);
. number of people made homeless (i.e. people needing immediate shelter); and
. number of people affected (i.e. people requiring immediate assistance during a
period of emergency; this can also include displaced or evacuated people).
(B) The number of people killed, i.e. persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and
presumed dead.
(C) The disaster-related economic damage (in 000’ US$).
Several methodologies exist to quantify disaster losses, but there is no standard pro-
cedure to determine a global figure for economic impact. Economic damage is defined
as the direct losses associated with a natural hazard impact after the event, but the indirect
damage and longer term macroeconomic effects are not considered (Pielke, Rubiera,
Landsea, Fernandez, & Klein, 2003). The first two indices (i.e. the number of total people
affected and the number of people killed) provide information on the human impact of
disasters, while the last index provides information on the economic impact of disasters.
Figure 1 shows the number of observations for the 41 countries over 1950–2006 which
have experienced a storm or earthquake according to the CRED specific criteria. This figure
clearly shows that the number of observations has risen. This increase has been discussed
and is attributed to societal change and economic development (Bouwer, Crompton,
Faust, Höppe, & Pielke , 2007; Escaleras & Register, 2012), as well as improvements in data
collection and reporting in the EM-DAT database (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt, & Hoyois, 2004).
Figure 2 shows the number of people killed as a result of storms or earthquakes for 41
countries over 1950–2006.9 We observe that there are two spikes in the number of people
killed as a result of storms between 1950 and 1960 and two spikes in the number of people
killed as a result of earthquakes between 1988 and 2000. The spikes for storms may reflect
the improvements in the prediction of storms (through technology, such as computer
modelling in storms) and in health care, while the spikes for earthquakes may depict
the improvements in the EM-DAT database.
Noting the wide variation in the observations on all disaster outcome variables (i.e. the
number of total people affected, the number of people killed and the economic damage),
we take the log form (ln) of these variables.10 Since some disasters in the sample resulted
in no deaths, we add one death to each observation (Escaleras & Register, 2012; Kahn,
2005).11
For the political decentralisation variables, we use all three Regional Authority Indices
developed by Hooghe et al. (2008b): Self-rule, Shared-rule and RAI-total. We also transform
these variables taking the natural logarithm, to make them more normally distributed. The
logarithm transformation also helps the interpretation of the results, as the natural disaster
outcome variables are also in natural logarithmic form.
For the controls, we use three variables obtained from the PWT: (a) government con-
sumption share of GDP per capita (%), (b) openness (%) and (c) annual growth rate in
GDP per capita (ln(GDPpct/GDPpct−1)). We do not include other controls, such as the
population, economic development (GDP per capita),12 consumption share of GDP per
capita and investment share of GDP per capita, due to their high correlation (above 0.5)
with the three control variables or the political decentralisation variables. Finally, we
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include the number of disasters in log form (ln) (due to the wide variation in the obser-
vations) as a control variable (source: EM-DAT).13 We believe that these control variables
capture some features of the nations and take into account some important sources of
heterogeneity.
The mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum value for the above vari-
ables are reported in Table 1. It should be noted that the descriptive statistics refer to
those observations where there are data for all variables (i.e. 392 observations for
storms and 144 observations for earthquakes).
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Figure 1. Number of observations by year.
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3.3. Empirical functions
We use the following empirical function to examine the association between disaster out-
comes and political decentralisation
Disit = f (PolDecit , Controlit , ut) (1)
where Disit is the disaster outcomes from storms or earthquakes for country i (i = 1, 2, 3,… ,
41) at time (year) t (t = 1951, 1952,… , 2006), PolDecit is a proxy for the degree of political
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Figure 2. Number of people killed by year.
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decentralisation for country i at time t, Controlit is a vector of controls for country i at time t
and ut represents time-dummies. We include time-dummies to control for all time-specific
space-invariant variables (Baltagi, 2005). In this study, these variables may include climate
change and improvements in technology. Time-dummies also control for possible
improvements in the EM-DAT database after 1988.
As part of our analysis, we also examine whether the association between disaster out-
comes and political decentralisation differs by national wealth, political institutions and
local representation. In other words, we examine whether GDP per capita, party orien-
tation with respect to economic policy, electoral level of the municipal governments
and electoral level of the state/provincial governments influence the relationship
between disaster outcomes and political decentralisation. We apply an interaction analy-
sis, because comparing subgroup-based correlation coefficients has lower explanatory
capacity as the division into subgroups reduces the sample size (Tselios et al., 2012).
We use the following empirical function to examine the role of economic development in
the association between disaster outcomes and political decentralisation.
Disit = f (PolDecitxDlit , Controlit , ut) (2)
where Dλit is a vector of dummy variables
14 for economic development with λ = 1, 2, where
λ = 1 is the dummy variable for the medium-income countries and λ = 2 is the dummy vari-
able for the high-income countries. We classify the countries into medium-income and
high-income using the World Bank’s definition of development (Escaleras & Register,
2012).
We use the following empirical function to examine the role of political institutions and
local representation in the association between disaster outcomes and political decentra-
lisation.
Disit = f (PolDecitxDmit , Controlit , ut) (3)
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, 1951–2006.
Storms (392 observations) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of people affected (ln) 3.3309 4.3889 0 15.4408
Number of people killed (ln) 2.2903 2.0053 0 8.5688
Economic damage (ln) 7.1825 6.1143 0 18.8796
Political decentralisation (ln) (RAI-total) 2.5881 0.7350 0 3.4995
Political decentralisation (ln) (self-rule) 2.4275 0.6434 0 3.1987
Political decentralisation (ln) (shared-rule) 0.9957 0.9448 0 2.5649
Government consumption 7.8707 2.3090 3.1681 19.2755
Openness 46.1956 34.4722 5.0043 212.8417
Annual growth rate 0.0258 0.0304 −0.1321 0.1238
Number of disasters (ln) 0.5549 0.7498 0 3.2958
Earthquakes (144 observations) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of people affected (ln) 7.1196 3.7138 0 14.2801
Number of people killed (ln) 2.3399 2.4074 0 9.7972
Economic damage (ln) 6.8706 6.0728 0 18.4207
Political decentralisation (ln) (RAI-total) 2.1549 0.8989 0 3.4995
Political decentralisation (ln) (self-rule) 2.0636 0.8125 0 3.0910
Political decentralisation (ln) (shared-rule) 0.5824 0.8562 0 2.5649
Government consumption 7.2802 2.5979 2.6949 15.9205
Openness 30.4823 23.1837 5.0687 130.9326
Annual growth rate 0.0301 0.0401 −0.1608 0.1900
Number of disasters (ln) 0.2620 0.4067 0 1.7918
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where Dµit is a vector of dummy variables for political institutions or local representation.
Data were obtained from the Keefer (2012) database. This database is available from 1975
to the present. More specifically,
. if µ denotes the party orientation with respect to economic policy, µ = 1, 2, 3, where µ =
1 is the dummy variable for the left-party countries (i.e. for parties that are defined as
communist, socialist, social democratic or left-wing), µ = 2 is the dummy variable for
the centre-party countries (i.e. for parties that are defined as centrist or when party pos-
ition can best be described as centrist such as the party advocating strengthening
private enterprise in a social-liberal context) and µ = 3 is the dummy variable for the
right-party countries (i.e. for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian Demo-
cratic or right-wing); and
. if µ denotes the electoral level of either the municipal governments or the state/pro-
vince governments, µ = 1, 2, 3, where µ = 1 is the dummy variable for the countries
where both the local legislature and the local executive are locally elected, µ = 2 is
the dummy variable for the countries where the executive is appointed, but the legis-
lature is locally elected, and µ = 3 is the dummy variable for the countries where neither
local executive nor legislature are locally elected.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Political decentralisation and storm disaster outcomes
Table 2 displays the regression results for empirical function (1) above, using the number
of people affected (ln) (Regression 1), the number of people killed (ln) (Regression 2), and
the economic damage (ln) (Regression 3) as dependent variables. Political decentralisation
(ln) constitutes the overall regional authority score (‘RAI-total’ score). Regression 1 and 2
show that there is a negative and statistically significant association between political
decentralisation and human outcomes caused by storms. The coefficient on the number
of people affected (−1.1705) is higher than that on the number of people killed
(−0.1847), i.e. decentralised countries experience lower numbers of people affected,
and to some degree numbers killed as a result of storms. Thus, there seems to be a
Table 2. Political decentralisation and storms’ disaster outcomes.
Number of people affected (ln) Number of people killed (ln) Economic damage (ln)
(1) (2) (3)
Political decentralisation (ln) −1.1705*** −0.1847* 0.9842**
Government consumption −0.1746** 0.0120 −0.1293
Openness −0.0423*** −0.0180*** −0.0008
Annual growth rate 2.4677 2.5543 −31.0671***
Number of disasters (ln) 2.6504*** 1.2477*** 3.9439***
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.5497 6.9612*** 2.3343
Observations 392 392 392
R-squared 0.4689 0.6471 0.4617
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors are not reported.
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need to further decentralise disaster risk reduction, as local government can be more
responsive to the needs of local residents (Marks & Lebel, 2016). Regression 3 shows
that there is a positive and statistically significant association between political decentra-
lisation and economic outcomes, that is, more decentralised countries experience higher
economic losses with storms. This finding is on the surface counter-intuitive, that is, one
would assume that economic losses and human impact go hand in hand. There are two
possible causes of this anomaly. One comes from the work of Pielke et al. (2003), who
point out that economic losses from storms in the USA are related to rising wealth and
population density in storm affected areas. Their work hints that even in decentralised
countries with some effective preparedness, the economic impact of storms is rising
due to increasing wealth in affected areas. The second argument is that historically disas-
ter risk reduction has focussed on protecting lives, rather than making livelihoods and
homes resilient to shocks (UNISDR, 2005, 2009). Both point to the need for a focus on
the resilience of livelihoods and economies in the face of storm shocks.
For the control variables, the results are discussed only briefly. First, we find that the
relationship between government consumption share and the number of people
affected is negative and statistically significant (Regression 1), that is, where government
spending in the economy is relatively large, fewer people are affected by storms. This is
perhaps due to relatively more spending on storm protection, early warning or disaster
recovery. The coefficient on government consumption for Regression 2 and 3 is statisti-
cally insignificant. Second, the coefficient on openness is negative and statistically sig-
nificant for both human outcomes (Regression 1 and 2), that is, the more
economically open, the fewer people killed or affected by storms, but it is not statistically
significant for economic outcomes (Regression 3). This was a difficult finding to explain,
and may simply be an artefact of the data, that is, the European countries which are not
affected by major cyclones are part of a shared economic area, whereas the USA and
Australia, which are affected by major cyclones, are less open due to their size and phys-
ical location. However, this is an interesting finding that requires more investigation.
Third, there is a negative association between the annual GDP growth rate and the econ-
omic damage (Regression 3), that is, countries with faster growing GDP per capita tend
to experience lower levels of economic loss from storms. However, the coefficient on
growth for Regression 1 and 2 is statistically insignificant. Fourth, there is a positive
(and unsurprising) association between the number of disasters and the human and
economic outcomes (Regression 1, 2 and 3).
We now explore whether national wealth, political orientation and local representation
intervene in the relationship between political decentralisation and storm disaster out-
comes according to empirical functions (2) and (3). Table 3 displays the coefficients on pol-
itical decentralisation by levels of national wealth, by political orientation and by local
representation. We find evidence supporting our main finding (as we saw in Table 2)
that relatively more politically decentralised countries fare better when storms strike in
terms of the effect on the population (i.e. number of people affected and number of
people killed), but with higher economic losses than less politically decentralised
countries, though the effect appears much more robust (a) in high-income countries
(Regression 1, 2 and 3); and, (b) in countries where the executive of municipal govern-
ments is appointed, but the legislature is locally elected (Regression 7, 8 and 9). Table 3
shows that there are no differences in the impact of political decentralisation when
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there is right-wing or left-wing dominant politics (Regressions 4, 5 and 6). Finally, countries
where neither the legislature nor the executive of state/province governments are locally
elected manage better storm outcomes on the population (i.e. number of people affected)
(Regression 10), while the impact of decentralisation on economic damage is statistically
significant only for countries where both the legislature and executive are locally elected
(Regression 12).
Table 3. Political decentralisation and storms’ disaster outcomes by economic development, political
institution and local representation.
Number of people
affected (ln)
Number of people
killed (ln)
Economic
damage (ln)
(1) (2) (3)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. Medium-income countries (62) −1.1333*** −0.0833 −0.7748
. High-income countries (330) −1.1674*** −0.1761* 0.8360**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.5026 6.8328*** 4.5608
Observations 392 392 392
R-squared 0.4689 0.6481 0.4922
(4) (5) (6)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. Left-party countries (122) −0.9871*** −0.1541 0.9399**
. Center-party countries (14) −1.2970** −0.1166 1.1366
. Right-party countries (145) −0.8290** −0.1795 0.9246**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 8.4944*** 3.3652*** 9.2107***
Observations 281 281 281
R-squared 0.5154 0.5226 0.4592
(7) (8) (9)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. Municipal governments: legislature and
executive are locally elected (219)
−0.9370** −0.0273 1.1213**
. Municipal governments: legislature is locally
elected (41)
−0.8813** −0.5391*** 1.4128**
. Municipal governments: no local elections (0) No data No data No data
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.9053* 1.8793** 8.6225**
Observations 260 260 260
R-squared 0.5315 0.6242 0.4872
(10) (11) (12)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. State/province governments: legislature and
executive are locally elected (214)
−1.1411*** −0.1780 1.1997***
. State/province governments: legislature is locally
elected (67)
−1.3200*** −0.1630 0.2901
. State/province governments: no local elections
(17)
−1.8772*** 0.2442 −0.6188
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.9011*** 3.2212*** 8.1585***
Observations 298 298 298
R-squared 0.4989 0.5379 0.4890
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Note: Parentheses in italics show the number of observations for each classification; standard errors are not reported.
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4.2. Political decentralisation and earthquake disaster outcomes
Table 4 presents the relationship between political decentralisation and earthquake disas-
ter outcomes following empirical function (1). We find decentralisation to be negatively
and statistically significant associated with the number of people affected (Regression
1), that is, more decentralised countries have fewer people affected in earthquakes.
However, decentralisation is positively and statistically significant associated with the
economic damage (Regression 3), that is, more decentralised countries have more econ-
omic damage. This mirrors the findings under storms. While the population outcomes
from earthquakes refer only to the number of people affected, the population outcomes
from storms refer to both the number of people affected and the number of people killed.
The conclusion from this is that greater transfers of political power to subnational tiers of
governments could be justified as a means to reduce earthquake disaster impacts on the
population, but again with a high economic cost.
As for the control variables, the coefficients on the three economic variables are statisti-
cally significant for the population outcomes only (Regression 1 and 2). The coefficients on
both government consumption and openness are negative, which is consistent with the
findings for storms (Table 2). It is remarkable that the coefficient on annual growth rate
is positive, that is, the faster the rates of economic growth the higher the economic
costs of an earthquake disaster. This supports earlier work noting that ‘rapid growth
comes at the expense of weak or ignored building codes, poor land zoning controls,
and the like’ (Escaleras & Register, 2012, p. 171). Finally, as expected, we find that there
is a positive association between the number of disasters and the human and economic
losses from earthquakes (Regression 1, 2 and 3).
We consider whether political decentralisation influences the earthquakes’ outcomes
differently across countries with different levels of national wealth and with different pol-
itical orientation and local representation following empirical functions (2) and (3). Table 5
shows that the negative impacts on the population appear more robust (a) in high-income
countries (Regression 1), (b) in right-leaning countries (Regression 4: as the magnitude of
the coefficient on political decentralisation is higher for right-party countries than for left-
party countries) and (c) in countries where both the legislature and executive of municipal
or state/province governments are locally elected (Regression 7, 8 and 11). The positive
economic damage effects appear more robust in right-party countries (Regression 6).
Table 4. Political decentralisation and earthquakes’ disaster outcomes.
Number of people affected (ln) Number of people killed (ln) Economic damage (ln)
(1) (2) (3)
Political decentralisation (ln) −0.8624** −0.1403 1.2615*
Government consumption −0.3379** −0.1878** −0.0436
Openness −0.0423** −0.0207* −0.0453
Annual growth rate 25.6556** 13.5087** 19.2058
Number of disasters (ln) 1.8927** 1.7279*** 3.2098**
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.1062 2.2694 −3.9603
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.5578 0.6155 0.4128
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors are not reported.
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4.3. Sensitivity analysis
Tables 2 and 4 showed that there is a negative and statistically significant relation between
a country’s degree of political decentralisation, measured by ‘RAI-total’ score, and the
number of people affected by disasters triggered by either storms or earthquakes. The
same is true when we decompose political decentralisation into ‘Self-rule’ and ‘Shared-
rule’ scores (Table 6: Regressions 1, 4, 7 and 10). However, the magnitude of the coefficient
Table 5. Political decentralisation and earthquakes’ disaster outcomes by economic development,
political institution and local representation.
Number of people
affected (ln)
Number of people
killed (ln)
Economic
damage (ln)
(1) (2) (3)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. Medium-income countries (51) −0.2581 0.1910 −0.7306
. High-income countries (93) −0.8055** −0.1091 1.0737
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.2089 2.3258 −4.2990
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.5698 0.6241 0.4618
(4) (5) (6)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. Left-party countries (28) −0.8187* −0.2594 0.7970
. Center-party countries (14) 0.4964 0.0742 1.2444
. Right-party countries (54) −1.1979** −0.3463 2.0991**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.8831*** 8.1904*** 7.5139
Observations 96 96 96
R-squared 0.6139 0.6356 0.4867
(7) (8) (9)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. Municipal governments: legislature and
executive are locally elected (73)
−1.0777** −0.5919** 1.4917
. Municipal governments: legislature is locally
elected (5)
−0.5542 −0.6630 −0.2164
. Municipal governments: no local elections (2) 2.5709 3.1199** 4.5276
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 13.0200*** 8.5250*** 7.7685
Observations 80 80 80
R-squared 0.7197 0.7285 0.5274
(10) (11) (12)
Political decentralisation (ln)
. State/province governments: legislature and
executive are locally elected (56)
−0.4596 −0.5133* 0.9901
. State/province governments: legislature is locally
elected (21)
0.0055 −0.0581 −0.1197
. State/province governments: no local elections
(23)
1.1602 −0.3287 −1.1476
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 8.4622** 8.4620*** 13.1836
Observations 100 100 100
R-squared 0.5690 0.6419 0.4273
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Note: Parentheses in italics show the number of observations for each classification; standard errors are not reported.
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of political decentralisation measured by ‘Self-rule’ for storms (Regression 1) is higher than
that measured as ‘Shared-rule’ (Regression 4). Table 6 also shows that the negative associ-
ation between political decentralisation and deaths associated with storms or earthquakes
is negative and statistically significant, but only when political decentralisation is
measured as ‘Shared-rule’ (Regression 5 and 11). Finally, no matter how political decentra-
lisation is measured, there is a positive and statistically significant relation between a coun-
try’s degree of political decentralisation and the economic losses from disasters
(Regressions 3, 6, 9 and 12). Overall, both the authority of a regional government over
those living in the region (‘Self-rule’ score) and the authority a regional government co-
exercises in the country as a whole (‘Shared-rule’ score) matter when it comes to the
number of people affected and the economic damage, while only the authority a regional
government co-exercises in the country as a whole matters for the number of people
killed.
We finally replicate the baseline empirical function above [empirical function (1)]
through estimation with fixed effects. In other words, we add unobservable national
Table 6. Decomposition of political decentralisation and disaster outcomes.
Number of people affected
(ln)
Number of people killed
(ln)
Economic damage
(ln)
Storms
(1) (2) (3)
Political decentralisation (ln) (self-rule) −1.3147*** −0.0862 1.0698**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.9953 6.6785*** 2.0634
Observations 392 392 392
R-squared 0.4672 0.6441 0.4604
(4) (5) (6)
Political decentralisation (ln) (shared-
rule)
−0.8037*** −0.3486*** 0.8636***
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.3521 6.5080*** 4.9794
Observations 392 392 392
R-squared 0.4628 0.6650 0.4650
Earthquakes
(7) (8) (9)
Political decentralisation (ln) (self-rule) −0.9101** −0.1092 1.3632*
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.1667 2.2712 −4.0556
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.5548 0.6146 0.4113
(10) (11) (12)
Political decentralisation (ln) (shared-
rule)
−0.9694** −0.4230* 1.5030**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.6754 2.1170 −3.3039
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.5639 0.6289 0.4210
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Note: Standard errors are not reported.
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specific effects into empirical function (1). These are time-invariant nationally omitted
variables, such as physical endowments which may affect exposure to hazards (e.g. pres-
ence of mountains, rivers and coastal proximity). This estimator controls for the omitted
variables that are peculiar to each country, accommodating some national
heterogeneity.
Table 7 shows a negative and statistically significant association between decentralisa-
tion and the number of storm-related fatalities (Regression 2), as well as a negative and
statistically significant association between decentralisation and the number of people
affected by earthquakes (Regression 4).
Consequently, we find evidence that greater transfers of political power to subna-
tional tiers of governments are justified as a means to reducing the impacts of storms
and earthquakes on the population (Regression 3 and 6). These findings must be inter-
preted with some caution, because although the fixed effects estimator wipes out all the
space-specific time-invariant variables, reducing the risk of obtaining biased estimation
results (Baltagi, 2005), this reduction in bias comes at a significant cost as it removes
cross-national variation from the data, affecting the efficiency of the parameter esti-
mates, especially when the cross-national variation is high (Higgins & Williamson,
1999; Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, & Tselios, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose & Tselios, 2010).
Finally, we prefer the pooled ordinary least squared (see Tables 2–6) to the fixed
effect (Table 7) coefficients, because the latter are interpreted as time-series effects, or
short/medium-run effects, as they reflect within-country time-series variation, whereas
the former reflect long run effects (Durlauf & Quah, 1999; Mairesse, 1990; Partridge,
2005).
Table 7. Political decentralisation and disaster outcomes: adding fixed effects.
Number of people affected (ln) Number of people killed (ln) Economic damage (ln)
Storms
(1) (2) (3)
Political decentralisation (ln) −0.8643 −0.8400** 0.3555
Government consumption −0.3707* 0.0502 0.0762
Openness −0.0329 0.0220** 0.0255
Annual growth rate −9.8797 −1.9404 −26.4381**
Number of disasters (ln) 2.5009*** 0.9943*** 2.8898***
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.0725 6.3778*** −0.0171
Observations 392 392 392
R-squared 0.4651 0.4008 0.4097
Earthquakes
(4) (5) (6)
Political decentralisation (ln) −2.4468** −0.5551 −3.4492
Government consumption −0.0376 0.1105 0.3476
Openness −0.1210 −0.0043 −0.2300
Annual growth rate 41.3474*** 13.4828* 46.2483*
Number of disasters (ln) 0.6487 0.8146 3.2856*
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.4953 −0.0568 −0.6761
Observations 144 144 144
R-squared 0.6295 0.6013 0.4867
*p < 0.1; standard errors are not reported.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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5. Conclusions
Hazards happen and due to a variety of factors, some hazards result in disasters. Our analy-
sis builds on previous work that highlights the importance of political institutions in disas-
ter outcomes, and reveals that political decentralisation is an important factor in
determining the impact of storms and earthquakes. Thus, our analysis underlines the
importance of local capability in managing disaster risk. We are aware that this study is
limited by both its focus on only two types of hazards and on only high-income and
upper middle-income countries. Nonetheless, important conclusions can be drawn for
those countries affected by storms and earthquakes.
In relation to both storms and earthquakes, our results suggest that greater transfers of
political power to subnational tiers of governments reduce hazard impacts on the popu-
lation. Hence, not only do countries with more fiscally decentralised governments experi-
ence fewer disaster-induced fatalities (Escaleras & Register, 2012; Skidmore & Toya, 2013;
Yamamura, 2012) but also countries with more politically decentralised governments.
There are several reasons why more effective local government may be able to influence
disaster outcomes. It could be argued that local governments can tailor disaster risk
reduction resources more closely to the needs of local citizens than national government
at all stages of the disaster. The downside is that more politically decentralised countries,
which are usually wealthier countries (Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010; Tselios et al., 2012),
can increase the direct economic losses associated with a disaster impact after the storm
or earthquake more than the less politically decentralised ones. Another explanation is
that local officials might be better informed about local needs before, during and after
a storm and, hence, are better able to set the optimal mix of local policies than are
central bureaucrats. Or it may simply be that local actors, faced by the recurrent risk,
can be involved in longer term risk reduction. However, our research generates a clear con-
clusion: from a policy point of view, it seems advantageous to give subnational govern-
ments more authority and autonomy in storm and earthquake risk planning. However,
other factors need to be considered to reduce the economic damage following disasters
triggered by storms or earthquakes. Finally, our results show that national wealth, political
orientation and local representation can moderate the effect of political decentralisation
on disaster outcomes.
This leaves us with the difficult task of identifying a way forward for research and
policy. Our findings support much of the community resilience literature which argues
that more political decentralisation can reduce the human cost of disasters, but we
recognise that this analysis has its limits. It is often the collapse of markets, the destruc-
tion of stock and the lack of access to capital that creates the longer term damage for
poor or fragile economies after a disaster. The next step is to identify the optimal mix
of decentralisation and growth policies to enable economies to bounce back more
quickly after disasters.
Notes
1. A natural hazard is a natural event (e.g. earthquake, storm, flood, hurricane, volcanic eruption,
tsunami) where there is a threat to humans, society and the economy. A hazard has the poten-
tial to cause widespread destruction and loss of lives and thus the potential to cause disaster.
2. See www.emdat.be
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3. On the one hand, the set of data where some country–year data are not observed due to
factors a and c will not produce bias because it has nothing to do with missing observations;
and on the other hand, the set of data where some country–year data are not observed due to
factor b may produce bias because it has to do with missing observations. Nevertheless, we
control for factor b using time-dummy variables.
4. ‘Self-rule’ refers to the authority of a regional government over those living in the region and
considers: regional authority over institutional depth (i.e. the extent to which a regional govern-
ment is autonomous rather than deconcentrated), policy scope (i.e. the range of policies for
which a regional government is responsible) fiscal autonomy (i.e. the extent to which a
regional government can independently tax its population) and representation (i.e. the
extent to which a region is endowed with an independent legislature and executive).
‘Shared-rule’ refers to the authority a regional government co-exercises in the country as a
whole and considers: regional authority over law making (i.e. the extent to which regional
representatives co-determine national legislation), executive control (i.e. the extent to which
a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings), fiscal
control (i.e. the extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of
national tax revenues) and constitutional reform (i.e. the extent to which regional representa-
tives co-determine constitutional change).
5. Here, the set of data where some country–year data are not observed is due to the missing
observations. However, evaluating and understanding the distribution of missing data, we
observe that the missing data will produce little or no bias in the conclusions drawn
about the population. Moreover, the ‘RAI-total’ index has been used in many empirical
studies.
6. https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
7. Again, we are confident the missing data will produce little or no bias and the data on controls
is still representative of the population as the PWT database has been used in many empirical
studies.
8. The disaster type of ‘storm’ includes tropical storms, extra-tropical cyclones (winter storms)
and local/convective storms [thunderstorm/lightening, snowstorm/blizzard, sandstorm/dust
storm, generic (severe) storm, tornado and orographic storm (strong winds)].
9. The number of (total) people affected by storms or earthquakes by year and the economic
damage from storms or earthquakes by year can be provided by the authors upon request.
10. The distribution of the disaster outcome variables are asymmetric and skewed, so most of the
mass is either on the left or on the right, while most of the mass of the logarithmic transform-
ation of these variables is nearly symmetrical.
11. For those countries where there were no resulting deaths (0), we cannot take the natural
logarithm because the logarithm of zero is not defined. Adding one death to each obser-
vation means the natural logarithm of one is zero, which represents countries with zero
deaths.
12. We prefer to use the government consumption share of GDP per capita rather than the GDP
per capita because the latter ‘no doubt reflects factors such as public desire for enhanced
building codes, the existence of early warning systems, and more disaster sensitive land
zoning and use decisions’ (Escaleras & Register, 2012, 171). All these factors are better cap-
tured by the government consumption share of GDP per capita.
13. We do not include the magnitude scale and value of storms (in kph, speed of wind) and earth-
quakes (Richter scale) because some countries have experienced multiple natural hazards in
the same year. Instead, we use the number of disasters each year, which has been used in
empirical studies on disasters (Ahmed & Iqbal, 2009; Escaleras & Register, 2012).
14. A dummy variable takes the value of 0 or 1 to indicate the absence or presence of some cat-
egorical effect that may be expected to shift the outcome. It is a proxy variable for qualitative
facts in regression analysis. A vector of dummy variables includes a set of dummy variables. In
other words, it represents levels within multiple variables.
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Appendix. Number of observations for storms and earthquakes.
Storms Earthquakes
Country Year Obs Obs (1950–2006) Diff % of obs Obs Obs (1950–2006) Diff % of obs
Albania 1992–2006 2 2 0 0.005 1 5 −4 0.007
Australia 1950–2006 31 31 0 0.078 4 4 0 0.028
Austria 1955–2006 9 9 0 0.023 1 1 0 0.007
Belgium 1950–2006 12 12 0 0.030 2 2 0 0.014
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995–2006 2 2 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.000
Bulgaria 1991–2006 4 5 −1 0.010 1 4 −3 0.007
Canada 1950–2006 26 26 0 0.065 0 0 0 0.000
Croatia 1991–2006 1 1 0 0.003 1 1 0 0.007
Cyprus 1960–2006 4 4 0 0.010 1 2 −1 0.007
Czech Republic 1993–2006 2 2 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.000
Denmark 1950–2006 9 9 0 0.023 0 0 0 0.000
Estonia 1992–2006 1 1 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.000
Finland 1950–2006 1 1 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.000
France 1950–2006 22 22 0 0.055 1 1 0 0.007
Germany 1950–2006 22 22 0 0.055 3 3 0 0.021
Greece 1950–2006 6 6 0 0.015 22 22 0 0.153
Hungary 1990–2006 4 5 −1 0.010 0 0 0 0.000
Iceland 1950–2006 0 0 0 0.000 2 2 0 0.014
Ireland 1950–2006 10 10 0 0.025 0 0 0 0.000
Italy 1950–2006 11 11 0 0.028 16 16 0 0.111
Japan 1950–2006 53 53 0 0.133 22 22 0 0.153
Latvia 1990–2006 2 2 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.000
Lithuania 1992–2006 3 3 0 0.008 0 0 0 0.000
Luxembourg 1950–2006 2 2 0 0.005 0 0 0 0.000
Macedonia 1991–2006 1 1 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.000
Malta 1964–2006 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000
Netherlands 1950–2006 12 12 0 0.030 1 1 0 0.007
New Zealand 1950–2006 8 8 0 0.020 3 3 0 0.021
Norway 1950–2006 4 4 0 0.010 0 0 0 0.000
Poland 1990–2006 5 6 −1 0.013 0 1 −1 0.000
Portugal 1976–2006 3 4 −1 0.008 0 0 0 0.000
Romania 1991–2006 6 6 0 0.015 1 3 −2 0.007
Russia 1993–2006 10 14 −4 0.025 7 19 −12 0.049
Slovak Republic 1993–2006 1 1 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.000
Slovenia 1990–2006 0 0 0 0.000 2 2 0 0.014
Spain 1978–2006 10 12 −2 0.025 1 2 −1 0.007
Sweden 1950–2006 5 5 0 0.013 0 0 0 0.000
Switzerland 1950–2006 15 15 0 0.038 0 0 0 0.000
Turkey 1950–2006 6 6 0 0.015 31 31 0 0.215
United Kingdom 1950–2006 19 19 0 0.048 1 1 0 0.007
United States 1950–2006 55 55 0 0.138 20 20 0 0.139
Sum 399 409 −10 144 168 −24
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